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In the past three decades, legalized gambling in the United States has grown from 
a limited activity to one that is extremely commonplace. Gambling in some form is now 
legal in every state except Hawaii and Utah. Gallup data from 2004 show that two in 
three Americans report participating in some form of gambling activity in the last 12 
months, with state lotteries being the most common. As legalized gambling continues to 
grow in popularity and prevalence, and new forms of gaming are introduced and 
expanded, there is much public debate about the costs and benefits of this sector of the 
economy. 
The gambling sector has always been viewed as different from other sectors of the 
economy.  Unlike other industries in which the market is the principal determinant of 
supply and demand, government decisions have largely determined the size and form of 
the legalized gambling sector in the United States. For example, in every state that has 
legalized lottery gambling, the state has declared itself the monopolist provider. In other 
forms of gambling, federal, state, and local governments determine the kinds of gambling 
permitted and the number, location, and size of establishments allowed.  
One explanation for this view and history of gambling is moral opposition to 
gambling as a legitimate form of entertainment. Another is concern that unregulated 
gambling would produce a number of negative effects on society. These include both the 
negative consequences for gamblers themselves – e.g., financial and family distress 
caused by problem gambling – and the negative externalities imposed on society, such as 
increased crime. On the other side of the debate, supporters of legalized gambling 
recognize the increase in consumer welfare for those who enjoy gambling and participate 
  1“responsibly”. Casino advocates point to potential economic benefits, including job 
creation and development. Politicians in favor of expanded gambling operations point to 
the revenue-generating potential for state and local governments of state lotteries and the 
taxation of casino revenues.  
Gross revenues from legalized gambling reached a record-high $72.9 billion in 
2003. More than 80 percent of this total is accounted for by revenues from commercial 
casinos, Native American casinos, and state lotteries. Figure 1 shows 2003 gross 
gambling revenues by industry. Commercial casinos brought in $28.7 billion (36.5 
percent); state lotteries grossed $19.9 billion (25.4 percent); and Native American tribal 
casinos grossed $16.8 billion (21 percent). Internet gambling generated $5.7 billion in 
gross revenues.
1 The remaining $7.4 billion is accounted for by pari-mutuel games, 
charitable games, charitable bingo, card rooms, and legal bookmaking
2. Figure 2 shows 
the reported gambling rates among American adults who participated in the annual 
Gallup Lifestyle Poll conducted in December of 2003. About half of Americans report 
having bought a lottery ticket in the past 12 months. A third report visiting a casino in the 
past 12 months, making it the second most common form of legalized gambling. 
Each of the gambling industries has a unique history and regulatory structure. 
Some policy issues are common to all industries in the sector, while others are unique to 
the particular form of gambling. This article attempts to identify and discuss from an 
economics perspective the major “winners” and “losers” associated with the three largest 
                                                           
1 Revenues are only available for a global market. Furthermore, the legality of the industry is not firmly 
established. 
2 Sports betting is legal in only two states: Nevada, through casino sports books, and Oregon, through a 
state lottery game. The 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission (NGISC) report estimated that 
the scope of illegal sports betting in the United States ranges from $80 billion to $380 billion annually, 
making sports betting the most widespread and popular form of gambling in America. 
  2segments of the legalized gambling industry: commercial casinos, Native American tribal 
casinos, and state lotteries. The article  both discusses evidence from recent research and 
points out relevant issues about which there remains considerable uncertainty. The paper 
also discusses a relatively new and rapidly growing segment of the industry: internet 
gambling. This final discussion raises more questions than it answers, as virtually no 
economic research currently exists on this new sector of the economy. 
CASINOS  
Prior to 1978, there were no legal casinos in the United States outside Nevada. In 
1990 the jurisdiction of Atlantic City, NJ became only the second jurisdiction in the 
country to allow casino gambling. By 2003, casinos operated legally in 37 states.
 3 There 
were 391 commercial casinos operating in 15 states and an additional 356 Native 
American casinos, operated by 222 tribes, in 30 states. Table 1 lists the number of 
commercial casinos and Native American casinos by state.  
Gross casino revenue in 2003 totaled $28.7 million, excluding Native American 
tribal casinos.
4 This represents a more than three-fold increase since 1990, when casino 
revenue totaled $8.7 billion. Native American, or Indian, casinos are operated by 
sovereign tribes that are generally exempt from many of the requirements and taxes 
imposed on traditional business owners. They brought in an additional $16.2 billion in 
2003. The rapid growth in this industry has been remarkable, as only a handful of tribes 
operated gaming facilities 20 years ago. Tribes opened their reservations to different 
games in the late 1970s and continued to open facilities and/or expand existing operations 
                                                           
3 Eadington (1999) provides a discussion of the history and operation of casinos in North America; Evans 
and Topeleski (2002) provide a review of the history of Native American casinos.  
  3during the 1980s. These facilities often operated in the midst of considerable legal 
uncertainty and legal battles with states.  
In 1988 Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) which 
upheld the sovereignty of tribes over their own development, but also recognized limited 
regulatory rights on the part of states. The IGRA defines three classes of gambling. Class 
I includes traditional Indian games, over which states have no jurisdiction. Class II games 
include bingo and is legal as long as “such Indian gaming is located within a State that 
permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or entity” and may be 
overseen both by tribes and by the National Indian Gaming Commission. Class III 
gambling includes all other forms of gambling, including table games and slot machines. 
The IGRA specifies that tribes can only offer Class III games when states allow these 
games elsewhere in the state. So, for example, any tribe in Nevada is eligible to operate a 
full-scale casino.
5  
There are active constituent groups on both sides of the casino debate. Proponents 
cite the obvious “pent up” demand among American adults for casino gambling, noting 
the spectacular rise in gambling participation that has grown alongside the increased 
availability of casino facilities. In addition to this increase in consumer utility, proponents 
note potential economic benefits such as job creation and economic development. The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 Slot machines in Nevada and NJ accounted for $9.8 million; table games in Nevada and NJ accounted for 
$4.3 million; and riverboat casinos accounted for $10.2 million of this total (Christiansen Capital Advisors, 
2004). 
5 Evans and Topoleski (2002) note that the federal courts have broadly interpreted this provision. They 
offer the example of Connecticut. At the time of passage of IGRA, the state of Connecticut allowed 
nonprofit organizations such as church groups to operate “Las Vegas-style” casino nights. The Pequot tribe 
of Connecticut requested a Class III gaming license, but their request was denied by the state. The Pequots 
sued in federal court and the court decided in their favor, arguing that statutes allowing “Las Vegas style” 
gambling in some situations rendered the rules guiding those events civil rather than criminal in nature. The 
provisions of the Act have been tested, notably in California, New Mexico, and Florida, where tribes have 
continued to operate casinos after compact negotiations deadlocked.  
  42004 industry report on Indian Gambling notes that Indian gaming facilities directly 
supported 240,000 jobs in 2003, paying out $7.9 billion in wages. Supporters of Native 
American casinos in particular point to the potential improvement in economic well-
being among reservation populations.  
On the other hand, opponents anticipate “cannabilized” sales from competing 
business sectors. Opponents also worry about potential social costs, including increased 
crime and other problem behaviors.
6 To the extent that casinos encourage problem 
gambling, they might lead to increased rates of bankruptcy, suicide, and family problems. 
An additional source of opposition, often voiced by state legislatures, is that the opening 
of casinos in a state would reduce state lottery revenue.  
Impact on surrounding communities 
Much of the economic research investigating the ancillary economic benefits of 
casinos has focused on riverboat casinos. Riverboat casinos are a uniquely American 
establishment. They began operating in Iowa in 1991 and quickly expanded throughout 
the Midwest. By 1998, over 40 riverboat casinos were in operation in Illinois, Indiana, 
Missouri, and Iowa.  Nearly 50 riverboat and dockside casinos were in Louisiana and 
Mississippi (NGISC, 1999).  
There does not appear to be empirical evidence of economic growth as a result of 
the expansion of riverboat casinos. In terms of generating local tourism, riverboats seem 
                                                           
6 Grinols and Mustard (2004) discuss multiple ways casinos could be expected to alter local crime rates. 
Casinos might reduce crime directly by improving legal earning opportunities, both through direct wage 
effects and positive economic development. Conversely, casinos might increase crime by (1) harming 
economic development by draining the local economy and increasing the incidence of prostitution and 
illegal gambling-related activities; (2) increasing the payoff to crime by creating opportunities for 
criminals; (3) increasing the prevalence of problem gambling and thereby increasing the amount of crime 
generated by gamblers looking to fund their habit; and (4) attracting visitors who are more prone to commit 
and be victims of crime. 
 
  5to have been most successful in places such as Galena, Illinois, where the tourism 
industry was already established. Case studies suggest that the bulk of patrons of 
riverboat casinos are day-trippers who spend virtually no time at local non-gambling 
establishments (NGISC, 1999). There thus appear to be few, if any, positive economic 
spillovers to the local hotel or restaurant industry. In support of the “cannibalization” 
hypothesis, Siegel and Anders (1999) provide empirical evidence that riverboat gambling 
in Missouri led to a displacement of revenue from industries that constitute substitutes for 
gaming activity, such as entertainment and recreation services. 
Evans and Topoleski (2002) conduct a rigorous examination of the economic and 
social impacts of Indian casinos for both Indian tribes themselves and surrounding 
communities. The authors employ a difference-in-difference empirical approach that 
compares economic outcomes before and after tribes open casinos to outcomes over the 
same period for tribes that do not adopt or are prohibited from adopted gaming ventures. 
Their analysis is based on data for all tribes in the 48 contiguous states for the years 1983, 
1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999. Based on the circumstances surrounding a 
particular tribe’s gaming operations, the authors define the opening date of an Indiano 
casino as either the date a tribe added Class III games to its casino or the date of the 
tribal-state compact signing a new casino into existence. 
Their analysis finds mixed results for the impact of Indian casinos on surrounding 
communities. Their difference-in-difference analysis finds that in counties where an 
Indian-owned casino opens, jobs per adult increase by about five percent of the median 
value. The authors also look at mortality as an outcome. Theoretically, the availability of 
casino gambling may increase substance abuse and suicidal thoughts and so could 
  6increase mortality rates. On the other hand, to the extent that casino gambling increases 
employment opportunities and income, improved economic well-being could lead to a 
decrease in mortality. Their data suggest that the opening of an Indian casino in a county 
leads to a 2 percent reduction in county-level mortality rates. However, the authors 
identify substantial negative effects as well - bankruptcy rates, violent crimes, and auto 
thefts and larceny each increase in the surrounding community by 10 percent. 
Grinols and Mustard (2004) empirically investigate the relationship between 
casinos and crime rates using county-level crime data on the 7 FBI Index 1 offenses 
(robbery, aggravated assault, rape, murder, larceny, burglary, and auto theft) from 1977 
to 1996. Their paper utilizes the quasi-experiment created by casino openings to identify 
a causal relationship.
 7 Their study includes all 3,165 counties in the U.S. and the period 
observed includes the introduction of casinos in all counties except those in Nevada. 
Their sample of casinos includes land-based, riverboat, and tribal-owned casinos.  
The authors find a sharp increase in most crimes after the introduction of casinos. 
Their results suggest that the effect on crime is low shortly after a casino opens, and 
grows over time. They calculate that roughly eight percent of crime in casino counties in 
1996 was attributable to casinos, costing the average adult $75 per year. In addition, they 
confirm that border counties also experience increased crime rates, which suggests that 
casinos increase aggregate crime, as opposed to merely shifting crime from one county to 
another.  
Of all the potential social costs of gambling, the link between casinos and crime 
has received the most research attention. It is very difficult to identify a causal link from 
  7casinos to problem and pathological gambling and associated consequences. The 1999 
Gambling Impact and Behavior Study by Gerstein et al.,  prepared for the National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission (NGISC)
8, yields some evidence suggesting that the 
opening of casinos has negative social impacts. Using criteria developed by the American 
Psychiatric Association, the authors estimate that about 2.5 million adults are 
pathological gamblers and another 3 million adults are considered problem gamblers.
9 
They find that such gamblers are more likely than other gamblers or nongamblers to have 
been on welfare, declared bankruptcy, and to have been arrested or incarcerated. 
Furthermore, their study finds that the availability of a casino within 50 miles (versus 50 
to 250 miles) is associated with about double the prevalence of problem and pathological 
gamblers. However, it is not clear that these associations reflect a causal link from 
casinos to problem behaviors. 
Though data on family problems, crime and suicide are available, tracking 
systems generally do not collect data on the causes of these incidents, so they cannot be 
linked to gambling. It is particularly difficult to identify a causal link between gambling 
and other problems, as pathological gamblers often have other behavioral disorders 
(GAO, 2000, p 3). Additional data and research establishing the causal link between 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 See Grinols and Mustard (2004) for a discussion of weaknesses in the previous literature, which has 
tended to focus on small samples and isolated case studies and/or has made no attempt to deal with issues 
of omitted variable bias. 
8 Congress created NGISC in 1996 to conduct a comprehensive study of the social and economic impacts 
of gambling the United States. The research included two national surveys of U.S. adults and youths; a 
survey of patrons at 21 gambling facilities; case studies in 10 communities; and detailed analyses of a 100-
community sample to determine the economic impact of casino gambling.  
9 Clinically, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) classifies pathological gambling as an impulse 
control disorder and describes 10 criteria to guide diagnoses, ranging from “repeated unsuccessful efforts to 
control, cut back, or stop gambling” to committing “illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft or 
embezzlement to finance gambling.” “Problem gamblers” experience a wide range of adverse 
consequences from their gambling, but fall below the threshold of at least five of the ten APA criteria used 
to define pathological gambling. 
  8casino availability and the incidence of personal bankruptcies, suicide, divorce, and other 
costly behaviors is needed.  
Impact on Native American tribes 
An explicit goal of the IGRA was to promote “tribal economic development, self-
sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.”
 Tribes frequently refer to casinos as the “new 
buffalo,” meaning the new source of economic sustenance for their communities. The 
tribes point to repaired infrastructure; diversifying economies; rising employment; 
augmented health, housing, education, and social budgets; greater indigenous language 
retention; and generally renewed community vitality (Taylor, Krepps, and Wang, 2000). 
Evans and Topoleski (2002) find that four years after tribes open casinos, tribal 
population is up by 12 percent and tribal employment has increased by 26 percent, 
resulting in an increase in tribal employment-to-population ratios of five percentage 
points (12 percent). In addition, the data suggest a 14 percent reduction in the fraction of 
adults in the tribe who are working but poor. Furthermore, the data offer no evidence that 
prior levels or changes in economic conditions determine which tribes adopt gaming. 
This latter finding bolsters confidence in a casual interpretation of the estimated effects of 
a tribal casino on population and employment.  
While the empirical evidence suggests that Indian tribes are, on average, clearly 
“winners” in this venture, the question remains as to whether this is the most efficient 
policy to improve economic circumstances on reservations. As Evans and Topoleski note, 
“After 130 years of reservation life, Native Americans on reservations were among the 
poorest people in this country, so the proceeding policies for economic independence 
were not working. Because the current program seems to be generating jobs does not 
  9necessarily mean that granting reservations a monopoly in a particular industry is a 
desirably policy (p. 49).” 
Impact on public revenue  
Casino businesses are subject to taxation and therefore have a direct impact on 
public revenue. Maximum tax rates on gross gaming revenues in American casinos range 
from 6.25 percent in Nevada to 35 percent in Illinois. Taxes on casinos are not an 
important source of public sector revenues for most states in the United States; only 
Nevada is heavily dependent on tax revenue from casino gaming. Non-Indian casinos 
paid over $2 billion in taxes to states on gaming revenues in 1997, compared to state 
lottery revenues of approximately $10 billion  in the same year (Eadington, 1999, p. 187).  
By law, states cannot tax the profits of tribal businesses. But in some states (e.g., 
Connecticut, Michigan, Wisconsin, California, and New Mexico), tribes have agreed to 
make annual payments to state governments. These fees are typically payments for the 
monopoly rights the state has granted the tribe to provide certain forms gambling. In 
2003, tribes contributed over $759 million to state and local governments via various 
forms of revenue-sharing (Meister, 2004, p.1). Table 2 lists tribal contributions to state 
and local governments by state. As shown, there is tremendous variability across states. 
The two tribes that operate Mohegan Sun and Foxwoods in Connecticut alone account for 
over half of these payments. 
Casinos might indirectly affect public revenue as well. Insofar as casinos generate 
additional business income, they might indirectly increase other forms of tax revenue. 
Insofar as they cannibilize sales from other businesses, they might decrease net tax 
revenue. Anders, Siegel, and Yacoub (1998) find that as a result of the introduction of 
  10two Indian casinos into Maricopa county, Arizona in 1993, employment and retail sales 
in the restaurant and bar sectors declined. Popp and Stehwien (2002) estimate a similar 
model to examine the effect of New Mexico’s eleven Indian casinos on gross state tax 
receipts using quarterly data from 1990 to 1997. They also find a negative effect of 
Indian casinos on state sales tax revenues; the introduction of a single Indian casino is 
found to be associated with a one percent decrease in county tax revenues, but the 
introduction of a second Indian casino in the county if found to reduce sales tax revenue 
by more than 6 percent. While suggestive, these analyses are limited in scope and their 
results do not necessarily generalize to the experiences of other states. Additional 
research on the link between casino gambling and state sales tax revenue is warranted. 
Casinos could also cannibalize sales from state lottery operations. Three studies 
offer evidence suggesting that they do. Siegel and Anders (2001) investigate the 
relationship between Indian casinos and state lottery revenue in Arizona. The authors’ 
empirical analysis finds that a 10 percent increase in the number of slot machines is 
associated with a 2.8 percent decline in  lottery sales. Elliott and Navin (2002) examine 
the impact that the introduction of riverboat casinos between 1989 to 1995 has on state 
lottery sales. They find that riverboat gambling expenditures have a negative and 
statistically significant impact on state lottery revenues. Fink and Rork (2003) build on 
this work by examining data on 48 states from 1988 to 2000 and using actual tax receipts 
from all forms of commercial casinos. Also, like Elliott and Navin (2002), the authors 
perform a Heckman two-step selection correction, but in the first stage the authors model 
the adoption of a commercial casino, rather than the adoption of a state lottery. Their 
analysis finds a strong cannibalization of state net lottery revenue by commercial casino 
  11tax revenue.  Specifically, they find that an increase of $1 in commercial casino revenues 
reduces net lottery revenues by $0.56.  
Unresolved issues 
The weight of the empirical evidence suggests that casinos do in fact impose 
negative social costs on surrounding communities, most notably, an increased prevalence 
of property and violent crime. Studies of riverboat casinos do not find evidence of 
positive economic spillovers, though Evans and Topeleski’s study of Indian casinos find 
some evidence of increased employment in the surrounding community. Future research 
is needed into the nature of the heterogeneity of effects. Casinos vary greatly in size and 
scope. Facilities in the top ten Indian gaming states accounted for 83 percent of total 
industry revenue.
10 Riverboat casinos are smaller than Las-Vegas-style casinos. It is 
reasonable to expect that a very large casino, such as Foxwoods in Connecticut, might 
increase both crime and employment in the county, while a small riverboat casino with 
less of a tourist draw might lead to no change in aggregate crime rates or net job creation. 
A better understanding of how the economic and social benefits and costs vary with the 
size, scope, and nature of a gaming establishment would have important policy 
implications. 
The distributional impacts are also not well-understood. Native Americans on 
reservations seem to be big winners of the tribal gaming movement with increased 
reservation population and employment. But who are those deciding to re-migrate to 
tribes or stay on the reservation? Are the Native American beneficiaries those who would 
have been economically successful elsewhere? Surrounding communities seem to win in 
                                                           
10 From highest to lowest, these states are California, Connecticut, Minnesota, Arizona, Wisconsin, 
Michigan, Washington, Florida, New Mexico, and New York (Meister, 2004, p.1). 
  12terms of job creation and lose in terms of increased bankruptcy and crime. But who are 
getting new jobs? And who are the victims of crime?  
In addition, future research should consider the optimal design of state-tribe 
compacts. The characteristics of tribal-state gaming compacts vary widely from state to 
state. Most compacts restrict the types of games, some restrict the size and number of 
casinos tribes can run, and other specify annual payments to states. Whether states design 
tribal compacts such that the revenue payments exceed foregone tax revenue is ultimately 
an empirical question that depends crucially on what gaming and tax revenue from 
commercial-casinos would be. Furthermore, the current legal environment prevents state 
and local governments from imposing a tax on tribal gaming ventures that would force 
them to internalize the costs of negative externalities on the surrounding community. 
Though some tribes do pay fees as specified in their compact, there is no standard 
practice across states.
11
And finally, a major issue common across all forms of legalized gambling is the 
efficiency costs associated with the established market structure. In many states, the 
nature of agreements between states and Native American tribes grants tribes monopoly 
power over the provision of casino-style gambling. Any explicit limitation on entry into a 
market imposes a deadweight economic loss on society. Future research should 
investigate the consequences of this market structure for consumers.  
                                                           
11 Thompson and Schmidt (2002) examine the Native American casino experience in the state of 
Wisconsin. They estimate that tribal casinos currently pay the state of Wisconsin $24.7 million per year, 
just over 2 percent of gaming revenues. They calculate that a similar-sized business would be paying state 
and local business and property taxes of roughly $90 million per year. They note that these taxes offset the 
costs of actual services businesses receive, including the right to offer a business activity with limited 
competition due to licensing restrictions and franchise requirements. 
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Lottery ticket sales totaled $41.4 billion in 2003, yielding gross revenues for 
states of $19.9 billion (Christiansen Capital Advisors, 2004). This represents annual 
average sales of $212 per adult living in a lottery state, or $372 per household 
nationwide. By 1998, every continental state without a lottery bordered at least one state 
with one, making out-of-state lottery gambling feasible for a sizeable number of adults. 
Nonetheless, participation in lottery gambling and average annual lottery expenditures 
are significantly and substantially higher among residents of lottery states than non-
lottery states (Kearney, forthcoming). 
The era of the modern state lottery began in 1964 in New Hampshire.
12 Following 
New Hampshire’s lead, New York and New Jersey soon introduced their own state 
lotteries. The spread of lotteries across the country primarily followed a geographical 
pattern, spreading first across the Northeast, then to the West, and finally to the Midwest 
and South.
13 In 2004 the state of Tennessee became the 39
th state, in addition to the 
District of Columbia, to operate a state lottery. In each case the state ended its former 
prohibition of lotteries and established a state agency as the sole provider of lottery 
products. Table 1 lists implementation dates.  
Every state that currently has a state lottery offers instant lottery games. Instant 
games - typically in the form of scratch-off tickets – were first introduced in 1974 as a 
product offered by the Massachusetts State Lottery. These games offer consumers instant 
feedback on whether they have won and, if the prize won is less than a designated 
                                                           
12 See Clotfelter et al. (1999) for a discussion of the history and operation of state lotteries. 
13 Much anecdotal evidence suggests that cross-border lottery sales place pressure on neighboring states to 
implement their own state lottery. Empirical evidence of the positive effect of border competition on lottery 
adoption decisions is found in Berry and Berry (1990) and Alm, Mckee and Skidmore (1993).   
  14amount, players can cash in on their winnings immediately. Instant tickets typically cost 
one, two, or five dollars, but states have recently started offering higher-priced instant 
tickets with opportunities to win multi-million dollar prizes. As shown in Table 2, sales 
on instant lottery games account for almost half of all state lottery revenue. 
There is substantial public controversy surrounding the use of lotteries as a means 
of raising public funds. Opponents argue that state lotteries prey on minorities and the 
poor and that spending on state lotteries displaces consumption and savings. Some worry 
that governments are “tricking” people with a “sucker’s bet,” exploiting misinformation 
on the part of consumers. Supporters of state lotteries counter that people from all 
demographic groups play the lottery. They argue that people demand gambling products 
and a state lottery capitalizes on that demand by providing a product that substitutes for 
other forms of gambling. Some characterize lottery sales as voluntary purchases of 
entertainment goods.  
Distributional impacts 
A number of studies have investigated the demographic predictors of lottery 
gambling and have tended to find that, on average, state lottery products are 
disproportionately consumed by the poor. (Recent examples include Worthington (2001), 
Hansen (1995), and Scott and Garen (1993). Clotfelter and Cook (1989) provide a review 
of earlier studies.) Kearney (forthcoming) reviews micro-level evidence on who plays the 
lottery from the 1998 National Survey on Gambling conducted by the National Opinion 
Research Council (NORC) under contract with the NGISC. The data reveal the following 
general trends. First, lottery gambling extends across races, sexes, and income and 
education groups. Second, black respondents spend nearly twice as much on lottery 
  15tickets as do white or Hispanic respondents. The average reported expenditure among 
blacks is $200 per year, $476 among those who played the lottery last year. Black men 
have the highest average expenditures.
14 Third, average annual lottery spending in dollar 
amounts is roughly equal across the lowest, middle, and highest income groups. This 
implies that on average, low-income households spend a larger percentage of their wealth 
on lottery tickets than other households. 
Interestingly, the regressivity of the state lottery appears to vary across lottery 
products. Low-income lottery players are more likely than other lottery players to bet on 
instant games. Among NORC survey respondents who report playing the lottery, 38 
percent of those in the lowest-income third report that they purchased an instant ticket the 
last time they played the lottery, compared to 27 and 19 percent of players in the middle- 
and highest-income third. Higher-income players are more likely to have purchased a 
ticket on a jackpot lotto game - 56 percent of those in the highest-income third, 49 
percent in the middle group, and 39 percent in the lowest-income third. The NORC 
survey also asks respondents about their favorite state lottery game. Instant games are the 
most common reported favorite among those in the lowest-income third, while jackpot 
lotto games are by far the most common stated favorite among those in the higher income 
categories.  
Oster (2004) examines data on Powerball lotto sales to analyze how regressivity 
varies with jackpot size within a single lottery game. She evaluates sales data by zip code 
                                                           
14 In order to develop estimates of annual lottery expenditures, Kearney uses a set of assumptions used by 
Clotfelter et. al. (1999), who calculate that estimates of national expenditures based on the NORC (1998) 
survey and this set of assumptions amount to only 86 percent of recorded sales. The reader should keep in 
mind that actual expenditures must therefore exceed reported amounts. That being said, the fifteen black 
male high-school dropouts in the sample report average annual expenditures over $1,000; among the ten 
who participated in lottery gambling during the year, annual expenditures are over $2,000. In the 1999 
Current Population Survey March file, mean income among this demographic group is $10,400. 
  16for 199 lottery drawings in the state of Connecticut in which the prize varied from $10 
million to $150 million. The data indicate that the lottery is less regressive at higher 
jackpot levels. One explanation could be that higher jackpots increase the “fun” of lottery 
gambling and richer individuals have a higher threshold for entry. Alternatively, richer 
individuals might have a better understanding of the fact that the expected value of a 
gamble increases with the jackpot size, and such individuals are more responsive to the 
effective price of a lottery gamble. 
The finding that regressivity varies with product characteristics has important 
policy implications. A state could mitigate the regressive – and potentially addictive – 
nature of its state lottery products by moving away from instant games. Instant tickets are 
highly lucrative for states, but are the product that particularly appeals to low-income 
consumers and, potentially, to problem gamblers. However, states appear to be moving in 
exactly the opposite direction by introducing higher-priced instant games. For example, 
in 2004 Connecticut introduced a $20 scratch-off ticket and the state has plans to 
introduce a $30 ticket in the summer of 2005. Some state lotteries, for example California 
and West Virginia, have recently introduced “Video Lottery Terminals (VLTs)”, which 
are stand-alone machines akin to the stand-alone legal “electronic gambling devices 
(EGDs)” offering video poker and video keno in some truck stops and restaurants, for 
example, in South Carolina. These machines are particularly controversial. Gambling 
experts have noted that such machines potentially create dependency among gamblers 
and have called them the “crack cocaine of gambling” (NGISC, 1999, p.2-6). 
Impact on consumer behavior 
  17Does spending on lottery tickets crowd out savings and consumption, or merely 
other forms of gambling? Analyzing multiple sources of micro-level data, Kearney 
(forthcoming) finds that household lottery spending is financed entirely by a reduction in 
non-gambling expenditures.
15 Her main analysis examines household expenditure data 
from the 1982 to 1998 Interview Survey files of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). During this time 21 states implemented a state 
lottery. The empirical analysis exploits the variation across states in the timing of state 
lottery introduction to compare the change in household expenditures among households 
in states that implement a lottery to the change among households in states that do not. 
The introduction of a state lottery is associated with an average decline of $46 per month, 
or 2.4 percent, in household non-gambling expenditures. This figure implies a monthly 
reduction in household expenditures of $24 per-adult, which compares to average 
monthly lottery sales of $18 per lottery-state adult.  
Among households in the lowest income third of the CEX Interview sample, non-
gambling expenditures are reduced by an average of 2.5 percent, 3.1 percent when the 
state lottery offers instant games. Furthermore, the data demonstrate a statistically 
significant reduction in expenditures on food eaten in the home (2.8 percent) and on 
home mortgage, rent, and other bills (5.8 percent). The data do not indicate which 
households purchase lottery tickets, so these average effects do not account for the fact 
that a substantial fraction of households do not engage in lottery gambling. For 
                                                           
15 These results are not necessarily inconsistent with the finding reported in Fink and Rork (2003) that 
casino revenues partially crowd-out lottery sales. A state lottery bet is much more expensive in expected 
value terms than a dollar gambled at a casino. Therefore, it is possible that the introduction of a state lottery 
would not cannibalize casino revenues, even if the introduction of a casino would cannabilize lottery 
revenues. 
  18households that do purchase lottery tickets, the decline in non-gambling expenditures 
must therefore be considerably greater. 
In order to determine whether the shift in household consumption from non-
gambling expenditures to lottery tickets is consumer-welfare enhancing, we must know 
whether lottery gamblers are rational, informed consumers, or whether, as some claim, 
the state is indeed taking advantage of misperceptions and mistakes on the part of 
consumers. There is evidence that in some ways, consumers, on average, appear to be 
making sound decisions with regard to lottery purchases, but that in other ways, they are 
not.  
Lottery gambling is part investment, as consumers are making choices over risky 
assets, and it is part entertainment. Assuming that the entertainment and pecuniary 
components of the lottery gamble are separable, maximizing behavior predicts that 
consumer demand for lottery products should depend positively on its expected return, 
holding constant game characteristics. To evaluate whether this prediction holds, Kearney 
(forthcoming) analyzes weekly sales and characteristics data from 91 lotto games from 
1992 to 1998. The analysis suggests that sales are positively driven by the expected value 
of a gamble, controlling for higher-order moments of the gamble and non-wealth creating 
characteristics. This finding is robust to alternative specifications, including controlling 
for unobserved product fixed effects. The data also reveal that consumers respond to non-
wealth creating, “entertaining” game features. Together, these two findings suggest that 
consumers are at least partly – and potentially fully – informed, rational consumers. It is 
consistent with these findings to claim that consumers derive an entertainment equal to 
  19the price of the gamble (one minus expected value), and then, insofar as they are making 
investments, they are informed evaluators of gambles. 
There is also evidence of mistaken investment decisions on the part of state 
lottery gamblers. Clotfelter and Cook (1993) and Terrell (1994) – provide evidence of the 
“gambler’s fallacy” among lottery players. The “gambler’s fallacy” is the mistaken 
notion that the second draw of a signal will be negatively correlated with the first draw. 
For example, if a slot machine has not won in a while, some gamblers believe it is “due” 
to win, or vice versa. Using data from the Maryland and New Jersey numbers games 
respectively, they find that the amount of money bet on a particular number falls sharply 
after the number is drawn and that it gradually returns to its former level after several 
months. 
Guryan and Kearney (2005) investigate whether consumers respond to the 
location of a winning lottery ticket. The sale of a winning lottery ticket at a store does not 
affect the likelihood that the retailer will sell a winning ticket in the future. Therefore, if 
fully informed consumers treat lottery tickets as purely financial assets, then store-level 
sales should not respond to such an event. However, weekly sales data from the full 
population of lottery retailers in the state of Texas reveal that between 2000 and 2002 
retailers who sell a winning jackpot ticket experience relative increases in ticket sales of 
the winning game between 12 and 38 percent the following week, and that the sales 
response increases in the size of the jackpot. The random assignment of winning tickets 
to stores, conditional on contemporaneous sales, allows this subsequent increase to be 
interpreted as causally related to the sale of the winner. To the extent that the sales 
response reflects a belief that the store is “lucky”, consumers are exhibiting irrational 
  20perceptions of randomness. If lottery consumers misperceive the probability of winning, 
they are in effect responding to the wrong price, and must forgo other consumption in 
exchange for the lottery tickets. Furthermore, the authors find that the increase in sales 
experienced by the winning vendor increases with the proportion of the local population 
comprised of high school dropouts, elderly adults, and households receiving public 
assistance. Therefore, if the response does reflect a mistaken notion, economically-
disadvantaged groups appear most likely to espouse it. 
The aggregate effect of state lotteries on consumer welfare is ambiguous.  For 
those rational, informed consumers who derive entertainment value from lottery 
gambling or who benefit from the easy access to gambling, consumer utility is clearly 
increased. For those who are irrational or misinformed, welfare is potentially harmed.
 16  
Impact on state government revenue 
All states use the profits from the state lottery operation as a source of revenue. 
On average, a dollar wagered on a state lottery game returns about 50 cents to players in 
the form of prizes and 30 cents of profit to the state, with the rest covering administrative 
costs. Lotteries’ contributions to state budgets are actually quite modest. In 2001, the 
contribution of state lottery funds to total own-source general revenues averaged 0.71 
percent across the 37 states with lotteries. Contributions ranged from 0.28 percent in 
Montana to 8.27 percent in Delaware (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2004).  
                                                           
16 A consideration of the welfare gains or losses associated with winning the lottery is outside the scope of 
this discussion. Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001) conduct an original survey of people playing the 
lottery in Massachusetts in the mid-1980s to estimate the effect of unearned income on economic behavior. 
They find that “unearned” lottery prizes reduce labor earnings, with a marginal propensity to consume 
leisure of approximately 11 percent. They also find that after receiving about half their prize, individuals 
saved about 16 percent. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that winners of exceptionally large prizes 
experience personal hardships, including divorce and depression, but to the best of my knowledge, there is 
no compelling research on this point.   
  21Of the 40 state lotteries, revenue from 10 is contributed to general funds and 
revenue from 18 is earmarked in total or in part for education. Other uses range from the 
broad (parks and rec, tax relief, economic development) to the narrow (Mariner’s 
Stadium in Washington and police and fireman pensions in Indiana). Given the 
fungibility of money, many economists question whether earmarked money actually 
increases spending on the intended category of expenditures. However, there has been a 
sizeable public finance literature documenting the so-called “flypaper effect”, whereby 
money “sticks where it hits”. Recent work has investigated whether this appears to be 
true for earmarked lottery revenue. 
Evans and Zhang (2002) investigate whether the 16 states that earmark lottery 
revenues for K-12 education see increases in spending in this category. They conduct 
three empirical tests. First, they examine states that switched the allocation of lottery 
profits from the general fund into public education during the sample period of 1978 to 
1998. Second, for the nine states that have always earmarked lottery profits for K-12 
education, they examine whether period-to-period changes in lottery profits correlate 
with period-to-period changes in state spending on education, controlling for state and 
year effects and state-specific time trends. Third, they utilize a two-state least squares 
approach to estimating the relationship between lottery profits and K-12 spending using 
the introduction of lotto games and video lotteries as instruments for lottery profits.  
  The authors find very similar results across the three approaches. A dollar 
increase in earmarked revenues contributes an additional 60 to 80 cents in K-12 
education expenditures. In comparison, in states that deposit funds into the general fund, 
each dollar of lottery profit increases school spending by 40 to 50 cents; in states that 
  22earmark lottery profits for other uses, a dollar of lottery profit increases school spending 
by only 30 cents. In a contemporaneous paper utilizing a similar methodology, Novarro 
(2002) also finds that the earmarking of lottery revenue to education does in fact lead to 
substantial increases in spending on education. She finds that a dollar of lottery profits 
earmarked for education increases current educational spending by roughly 36 cents more 




First, in addition to the distributional consequences of consumer spending on state 
lotteries, the distributional consequences of state lottery revenue need to be investigated. 
For example, in those states that earmark lottery revenue for education, what 
demographic groups appear to benefit from any increase in education spending? Borg, 
Mason, and Shapiro (1991) use survey data from Florida to document that for most 
households the education subsidies paid for by the state lottery are larger than the cost of 
the lottery for the individual family. However, for the lowest income bracket, lottery 
expenditures appear to exceed received education subsidies. More general research on the 
full distributional consequences is needed. 
Second, the discussion of consumer consequences of state lotteries has focused on 
the effects for the consumers themselves. An additional concern is whether the individual 
gambler makes choices that harm those around him, in particular, other members of his 
household. Traditionally, economists have considered the family or household as a single 
                                                           
17 Several earlier papers, including Mikesell and Zorn (1986), Borg and Mason (1988, 1990), Borg et al. 
(1991), and Spindler (1995), conclude that the earmarking of lottery funds to education does not increase 
education spending. However, the empirical analyses of these papers have methodological limitations that 
prohibit a causal interpretation of the results.  
  23unit that maximizes a common objective function subject to the family budget constraint. 
But recent evidence, in particular from the development economics literature, suggests 
that the household is a collective, not a unitary, entity and that expenditures depend in 
part on who controls the household income. If the members of the household do not share 
a common utility function, any increase in gambling expenditures might come at the 
expense of the well-being of those not in control of the household finances. More 
research on the intra-family externalities associated with lottery gambling is needed. 
More generally, additional research is needed on associated costly behaviors, including, 
for example, the incidence of financial distress and bankruptcy. 
Third, issues related to market structure are beyond the scope of this article, but 
should be considered in any normative analysis of the operation of state lotteries. As has 
been noted above, state lotteries operate as state monopolies. The state’s take is much 
larger than the house advantage (defined as percentage the house takes out of a dollar on 
average) found in casinos.
18 Competition from private lotteries or casinos could directly 
benefit consumers by compelling state lottery commissions to increase the payout on 
lottery gambles. Research into this issue is warranted.  
A related issue is market competition across states. Observers have noted a “race 
to the bottom” among states to offer lottery games. This pressure manifests itself not only 
in the decision to implement a state lottery, but also to offer higher-priced instant tickets, 
introduce Video Lottery Terminals, and participate in bigger games, such as Powerball. 
Tosun and Skidmore (2004) investigate the effects of the introduction of state lottery 
games in neighboring states on West Virginia lottery revenue. Data on lottery sales for all 
  2455 counties in West Virginia over the period 1987 to 2000 suggest that lottery game 
adoptions in bordering states have had statistically and economically significant negative 
effects on West Virginia border county lottery sales. More research into the nature and 
effects of state competition is warranted. 
Finally, an important policy consideration in the operation of state lotteries is 
advertisting.  In 2002, state lotteries spent about $466 million to advertise, roughly one 
percent of total sales (LaFleur). Policy analysts ought to consider who is targeted by state 
advertising campaigns and whose gambling behavior is affected. A main justification for 
the state’s role as monopoly provider of lotteries is “protection” of the public. But if 
states are setting the price of a lottery gamble (where price is defined as the ticket price 
minus the expected return) relatively high, innovating with products that are deemed 
most regressive and addictive, and aggressively advertising their product, then it what 
sense is the state “protecting” the consumer? And if the state’s role is not protective, but 
rather profit-driven, wouldn’t consumer welfare be enhanced by allowing private 
competitors to enter the industry? 
INTERNET GAMBLING 
The double-digit growth in legalized gambling revenues experienced during the 
1980s and 1990s now seems to be limited to three sectors: tribal gaming, legal sports 
betting, and Internet gambling. From 2002 to 2003, revenue from tribal gambling grew 
by 16.23 percent and revenue from Nevada sports betting grew by 11.98 percent. Internet 
gambling saw an increase in revenue of 42 percent (Christiansen Capital Advisors, 2004).  
                                                                                                                                                                             
18 Eadington (1999) presents the estimated house advantage for select casino games: craps 1.41%; 
blackjack .50%; roulette (American) 5.26%; roulette (European) 2.70%; baccarat 1.25%; pai gow poker 
2.50%; video poker 2%; slot machines 5%; and keno 28%. 
  25Since the emergence of internet gambling in the mid-1990s, Internet gambling 
operators have established approximately 1,800 e-gaming web sites in locations outside 
the United States. Though precise data is not readily available, estimates of the size of the 
online gambling industry are generally around $5 billion (GAO 2002). According to 
Christiansen Capital Advisors LLC, the annual revenue of online operators has grown 
from $1.2 billion in 1999 to $5.7 billion in 2003 (Hahn and Tetlock, 2004). Multiple 
sources report that U.S. customers account for roughly half of the total operating 
revenues from Internet gambling (GAO 2002).  
ComScore, a private company that uses data collection technology to measure 
Internet audiences, reports that in December 2001 there were 13.6 million unique visitors 
to gambling sites. One might conjecture that Internet users represent a more 
economically-advantaged slice of the population and that this type of gambling, unlike 
state lottery gambling, is therefore concentrated among higher-educated or higher-income 
consumers. On this point, ComScore (2002) notes that Internet surfers with a household 
income of less than $25,000 represent 11 percent of the overall on-line population and 13 
percent of visitors to gambling sites. It would be interesting to know what share of online 
gambling revenue is accounted for by bets placed by consumers in this income group. In 
other words, do the “heavy” bettors tend to be concentrated among low-income Internet 
users? 
The major policy issue regarding Internet gambling is the optimal level and form 
of regulation, or alternatively, taxation. In general, gambling is a matter of state law, with 
each state determining whether individuals can gamble within its borders and whether 
gaming businesses can legally operate there. Six states have explicitly prohibited Internet 
  26gambling:  Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, Oregon, and South Dakota. Since 
Internet gambling typically occurs through interstate or international means – with a web 
site located in one state or country and the gambler in another – federal law is used to 
protect the states from having their laws circumvented. The Department of Justice has 
investigated and brought charges against at least 20 Internet gambling operators on 
charges of violating the Federal Wire Act of 1961. This Act stipulates that it is illegal to 
use “wire communications” to place or assist with placing bets or wagers; courts have 
disagreed on the applicability of certain provisions of the statute to Internet gambling 
(Hahn and Tetlock, 2004). Federal prosecutors have also pressured American companies 
to stop providing services to offshore gambling sites. Google, Yahoo, and Lycos stopped 
advertising on the sites in April 2004 after significant pressure from federal prosecutors. 
Many American credit card companies, e.g. Visa and Mastercard, no longer allow their 
credit cards to be used for Internet betting
19 (GAO, 2002; Hahn and Tetlock, 2004).  
To determine what degree and form of regulation is optimal requires an 
understanding of the costs and benefits of the existence of a well-functioning Internet 
gambling market. Again, social welfare is enhanced insofar as the introduction of this 
good increases consumer utility. Internet gambling is exceptionally inexpensive, 
imposing virtually no transportation or transaction costs on consumers. On the other 
hand, an increase in youth gambling, gambling addiction, and crime are all potential 
social costs of the rise in Internet gambling. As the Internet provides the luxury of 
anonymity and privacy, Internet gambling might be more problematic - relative to 
                                                           
19 Efforts to restrict the use of credit cards for Internet gambling can be circumvented by cardholders’ use 
of on-line payment providers to pay for gambling activities.  Moreover, as banks increasingly choose to 
restrict the use of credit cards for Internet gaming, Internet gambling sites are expected to emphasize newer 
forms of payment, such as e-cash, that could eventually replace credit cards. (GAO, 2002) 
  27traditional forms of gambling - in terms of attracting youth and problem gamblers. The 
unique features of Internet gambling also lead to a heightened potential for credit card or 
other fraud. Empirical evidence on all these points is lacking. 
The availability of internet gambling might also have negative effects on worker 
productivity. ComScore (2002) finds that people spent a total of 274 million minutes on 
gambling sites, with visitors spending 20.2 minutes on average per month on the sites. 
This compares to 9.8 average monthly minutes for visitors to health-information sites, 
35.8 minutes for travel sites, 52.8 minutes for general news sites, and 62.0 minutes for 
sports sites. They report that one-third of gambling visits occur at work.  
An important consideration is how internet gambling will affect traditional forms 
of gambling. On the one hand, internet gambling might cannibalize state lottery sales and 
casino revenue. On the other hand, some gamblers who might not otherwise purchase a 
lottery ticket or travel to a casino will indulge in this anonymous, virtually costless form 
of gambling and learn that they like gambling. Internet gambling could thus encourage 
participation in other forms of gambling. A related issue is whether the advertising of on-
line gambling sites has spillover effects – either positive or negative – to brick-and-
mortar gambling establishments. ComScore (2002) reports that the online casino industry 
ranks as the fifth largest online advertiser among 138 industry segments. Online 
advertising by virtual casinos increased 170 percent between December 2000 and 2001, 
from 911 million advertising impressions to 2.5 billion. Does this internet advertising 
increase the total market demand for gambling products or merely increase the market 
share of online betting sites? 
  28There is also a potential interaction between the regulations imposed on 
traditional forms of gambling and the growth in internet gambling. As internet gambling 
is largely provided by offshore companies outside the reach of American gambling 
regulations, heavier regulations of off-line gaming establishments might encourage 
people to shift to these gambling outlets. The reverse is also true – increased regulation of 
internet gambling might increase the revenues of other gambling ventures, or lessen the 
potential decrease. An additional issue, noted by Hahn and Tetlock (2004), is that any 
benefits of regulation ought to be weighed against the cost of discouraging the existence 
of gambling and information markets with useful economic purposes, such as the Iowa 
Electronic Markets, which track economic and political events such as elections.  
Conclusion 
  This paper has attempted to review the most compelling empirical evidence about 
the social and economic costs and benefits associated with the three largest industries in 
the legalized gambling sector – commercial casinos, Native American casinos, and state 
lotteries. The obvious economic winners are the businesses themselves and the 
consumers who benefit from consumption of their product. Very little work, if any, has 
been done to document the increase in consumer utility associated with the increased 
availability of legalized gambling. Most of the research reviewed here on casino 
gambling has focused on documenting the impacts of casinos on surrounding 
communities, the impact of tribal casinos on the affected reservation population, and the 
impact on net public revenues. The work reviewed on state lotteries has tended to 
investigate the effect on consumer behavior and public revenue. 
  29Many important economic issues remain to be studied and additional rigorous 
research is needed. The issue of substitutability across gambling types has been widely 
addressed in the literature, but is still not entirely understood. There appears to be some 
evidence of substitution,  but recent history suggests that Americans gamble in increasing 
numbers and increasing sums. How much of an increase in gambling will we experience 
before reaching an equilibrium level? Is there an optimal level? Issues related to market 
structure, including the optimal level of regulation, need to be addressed. How much does 
regulation of one gambling industry drive demand for another? Is regulation an effective 
tool for encouraging less costly or more beneficial forms of gambling? What are the 
economic costs associated with the monopoly status granted to states over monopolies 
and, in many states, to Native American tribes over casinos? The ultimate policy question 
in the debate over legalized gambling is from a social welfare point of view, to what 
extent the increase in consumer utility and public revenue offsets the associated social 
costs. This piece has attempted to shed some light on this issue and serve as a call for 
additional work in the area.
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  34Figure 1: 2003 Gross Gambling Revenues by Industry, in billions 
 
Total: $78.6 billion 
 
 
Source: Christiansen Capital Advisors (2004) 
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Figure 2: Participation in Forms of Gambling Over the Past 12 Months 
 
 
Gallup Lifestyle Poll, December 11-14, 2003
 
Bought a state lottery ticket  49% 
Visited a casino  30%
Participated in an office pool  15%
Played a video poker machine  14%
Bet on professional sports  10% 
Bet on college sports  6% 
Played bingo for money  5% 
Bet on a horse race  4% 
Bet on a boxing match  2% 
Gambled on the Internet  1% 
Any other kind of gambling  13%
 
 
Source: Jones, Jeffrey. 2004. “Gambling a Common Activity for Americans,” The Gallup Organization. March 24. 
http://www.gallup.com/poll. Accessed 11/1/2004. 
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Table 1: Availability of Legalized Gambling, by State 
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outlawing (year  
law enacted) 
Alabama -  -  3     
Alaska -  -  3
1   
Arizona 7/81  7/81  22     
Arkansas -  -       
California 10/85  2/90  56     
Colorado 1/83  10/84  2  40   
Connecticut 2/72  9/95 2     
Delaware 10/75  2/76    1   
D.C. 8/82  8/82       
Florida 1/88  1/88  6     
Georgia 6/93  6/93      
Hawaii -  -      
Idaho 7/89  7/89  6    
Illinois 6/74  10/75    9  Yes  (1999) 
Indiana 10/89  10/89    9   
Iowa 8/85  8/85  2  14   
Kansas 11/87  11/87  6     
Kentucky 4/89  4/89       
Louisiana 9/91  9/91  3 13  Yes  (1997) 
Maine 6/74  1/75  1     
Maryland 5/73  2/76       
Massachusetts 3/72  5/74       
Michigan 11/72  10/75  16 3  Yes  (1999) 
Minnesota 4/90  4/90  19     
Mississippi - - 2 29   
Missouri 1/86  1/86    10   
Montana 6/87  6/87  25     
Nebraska 9/93  9/93  1     
Nevada -  -  3  224  Yes  (1997) 
New Hampshire  3/64  5/96       
New Jersey  12/70  6/75    13   
New Mexico  4/96  4/96  19  1   
New York  6/67  1/76  6     
North Carolina  -  -  2     
North Dakota  -  -  5     
Ohio 8/74  6/76      
Oklahoma -  -  73     
Oregon 4/85  4/85  8    Yes  (2001) 
Pennsylvania 3/72 5/75       
Rhode Island  5/74  5/76    2   
South Carolina  1/02  1/02  1     
South Dakota  9/87  9/87  12  19  Yes (2000) 
Tennessee 1/04  1/04       
Texas 5/92  5/92  1     
Utah -  -      (gambling  illegal) 
Vermont 2/78  6/78       
Virginia 9/88  9/88      
Washington 11/82  11/82 28     
West Virginia  1/86  6/86    4   
Wisconsin 9/88  9/88  22     
Wyoming -  -  1     
Total     356  391   
Sources: State lottery dates reproduced from Kearney (forthcoming); Indian Casino data from Meister (2004); Commerical 
casino data from http://www.gamblinganswers.com/casinos/country/us/  (Accessed on 1/19/05) and Christiansen Capital 
  37Advisors, LLL http://www.cca-i.com (Accessed on 1/19/05).  Internet gambling data from American Gaming Association 
http://www.americangaming.org/Industry/factsheets/issues_detail.cfv?id=17 (Accessed on 1/19/05). 
Notes:  
1. Number of tribes does not include the Native Villages that conducted gaming activities as non-profit organizations (60 in 
2003).  
2. Includes traditional casinos and riverboats, as well as racinos (racetrack casinos). 
 
 
























State and Local 
Governments  
Alabama          
Alaska    8.4    $0.3
4
Arizona 322.3  159.2  1,218.3    42.9 
Arkansas          
California 2,764.3  1,193.0  4,225.8    131.6 
Colorado 391.5  2,54.3  55.2  698.3   
Connecticut 865.3  530.7 2,022.6    396.4 
Delaware 628.1  22.3    502.0   
D.C. 228.9  36.1       
Florida 2,920.6  1,126.4  683.4     
Georgia 2,604.4  1,486.2       
Hawaii         
Idaho 98.3  60.9  119.0  330.3  4.8
4
Illinois 1,585.8  697.9    1,709.3   
Indiana 665.6  386.2    2,229.9   
Iowa 187.8  84.9   694.3   
Kansas 210.8  86.6  170.4     
Kentucky 673.5  319.9       
Louisiana 311.6  102.5  493.8  2,017.4  10.2 
Maine 164.6  124.9      0.1
5
Maryland 1,322.4  315.9       
Massachusetts 4,197.8  2,891.7      
Michigan 1,697.9  681.8  870.6  1,130.2  31.5 
Minnesota 351.7  210.9  1,385.7    16.1
4
Mississippi       2,701.3   
Missouri 718.2  403.8    1,331.7   
Montana 34.7  10.1  14.9     
Nebraska 80.9  40.5       
Nevada    44.0  9,625.3   
New Hampshire  221.3  151.0       
New Jersey  2,075.7 901.2    4,488.5   
New Mexico  137.0  80.2 610.7 154.4  36.9 
New York  5,413.1  2,412.0  549.2  39.0   
North Carolina        5.0
5  
North Dakota      95.0     
Ohio 2,069.1  1,077.8      
Oklahoma     465.9     
Oregon 853.2  133.0  426.1    8.8 
Pennsylvania 2133.0  796.6       
Rhode Island  554.0  75.8    333.5   
South Carolina  722.4  422.9      1.0 
South Dakota  647.0  13.3  50.0  70.4   
Tennessee          
Texas 3,149.6  2,148.0       
Utah          
Vermont 79.7  67.2       
  38Virginia 1,135.7  543.4       
Washington 460.4  241.9  769.5    2.9
4
West Virginia  1,081.9  105.4    781.5   
Wisconsin 435.1  245.2  1,077.9    32.0 
Wyoming          
Total $44,194.9  $20,641.9  $16,249.8
  $28,798.1  $759.4
6
Sources: State lottery data from LaFleur’s magazine Vol. 11 Sept 2003.  Indian casino and commercial casino data from Meister 
(2004). 
Notes: 
1. Includes revenue from all games, including instant games. 
2. Alabama, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming account for 
$893.3 million in revenues. 
3. Includes traditional casinos and riverboats, as well as racinos (racetrack casinos). 
4. Incomplete data.  Missing years are estimated to be equal to previous year’s amount. 
5. Annual contribution is a fixed amount. 
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